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Abstract
Die-rolling is the cryptographic task where two mistrustful, remote parties wish to generate
a random D-sided die-roll over a communication channel. Optimal quantum protocols for this
task have been given by Aharon and Silman (New Journal of Physics, 2010) but are based on
optimal weak coin-flipping protocols which are currently very complicated and not very well
understood. In this paper, we first present very simple classical protocols for die-rolling which
have decent (and sometimes optimal) security which is in stark contrast to coin-flipping, bit-
commitment, oblivious transfer, and many other two-party cryptographic primitives. We also
present quantum protocols based on integer-commitment, a generalization of bit-commitment,
where one wishes to commit to an integer. We analyze these protocols using semidefinite pro-
gramming and finally give protocols which are very close to Kitaev’s lower bound for any
D ≥ 3. Lastly, we briefly discuss an application of this work to the quantum state discrimina-
tion problem.
1 Introduction
Die-rolling is the two-party cryptographic primitive in which two spatially separated parties, Alice
and Bob, wish to agree upon an integer d ∈ [D] := {1, . . . ,D}, generated uniformly at random,
over a communication channel. When designing die-rolling protocols, the security goals are:
1. Completeness: If both parties are honest, then their outcomes are the same, uniformly random,
and neither party aborts.
2. Soundness against cheating Bob: If Alice is honest, then a dishonest (i.e., cheating) Bob cannot
influence her protocol outcome away from uniform.
3. Soundness against cheating Alice: If Bob is honest, then a dishonest (i.e., cheating) Alice cannot
influence his protocol outcome away from uniform.
We note here that Alice and Bob start uncorrelated and unentangled. Otherwise, Alice and
Bob could each start with half of the following maximally entangled state
1√
D
∑
d∈[D]
|d〉A |d〉B
∗Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, and MajuLab, CNRS-UNS-NUS-NTU Inter-
national Joint Research Unit, UMI 3654, Singapore. Email cqtjwjs@nus.edu.sg
1
and measure in the computational basis to obtain a perfectly correlated, uniformly random die-
roll. Thus, such a primitive would be trivial if they were allowed to start entangled.
Die-rolling is a generalization of a well-studied primitive known as coin-flipping [Blu81] which
is the special case of die-rolling when D = 2. In this paper, we analyze die-rolling protocols in a
similar fashion that is widely adopted for coin-flipping protocols [ATVY00, NS03, KN04, Moc07,
CK09, NST15, NST16]. That is, we assume perfect completeness and calculate the soundness in
terms of the cheating probabilities, as defined by the symbols:
P∗B,d: Themaximum probability withwhich a dishonest Bob can force an honest Alice to accept
the outcome d ∈ [D] by digressing from protocol.
P∗A,d: The maximum probability with which dishonest Alice can force an honest Bob to accept
the outcome d ∈ [D] by digressing from protocol.
We are concerned with designing protocols which minimize the maximum of these 2D quantities
since a protocol is only as good as its worst cheating probability. Coincidentally, all the protocols
we consider in this paper have the property that all of Alice’s cheating probabilities are equal and
similarly for a cheating Bob. Therefore, for brevity, we introduce the following shorthand notation:
P∗A := max{P∗A,1, . . . , P∗A,D} and P∗B := max{P∗B,1, . . . , P∗B,D}.
When D = 2, the security definition for die-rolling above aligns with that of strong coin-
flipping. For strong coin-flipping, it was shown by Kitaev [Kit02] that any quantum protocol
satisfies P∗A,1P
∗
B,1 ≥ 1/2 and P∗A,2P∗B,2 ≥ 1/2, implying that at least one party can cheat with proba-
bility at least 1/
√
2. It was later shown by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] that all four cheating
probabilities can be made arbitrarily close to 1/
√
2 by using optimal quantum protocols for weak
coin-flipping as discovered by Mochon [Moc07].
Kitaev’s proof for the lower bound on coin-flipping extends naturally to die-rolling; it can be
shown that for any quantum die-rolling protocol, we have
P∗A,dP
∗
B,d ≥
1
D
for any d ∈ [D]. This implies the lower bound max{P∗A, P∗B} ≥ 1/
√
D. In fact, extending the
optimal coin-flipping protocol construction in [CK09], it was shown by Aharon and Silman [AS10]
that forD > 2, it is possible to find quantum protocols where themaximum of the 2D probabilities
is at most 1/
√
D+ δ, for any δ > 0.
The optimal protocols in [CK09] and [AS10] are not explicit as they rely on using Mochon’s
optimal weak coin-flipping protocols as subroutines. Moreover, Mochon’s protocols are very com-
plicated and not given explicitly, although they have been simplified [ACG+15].
The best known explicit quantum protocol for die-rolling1 of which we are aware is given
in [AS10]. It uses three messages and has cheating probabilities
P∗A :=
D+ 1
2D
and P∗B :=
2D− 1
D2
.
These probabilities have the attractive property of approximating Kitaev’s lower bound in the
limit, but since P∗A → 1/2 as D → ∞, the maximum cheating probability is quite large.
This motivates the work in this paper which is to find simple and explicit protocols for die-
rolling that approximate Kitaev’s lower bound on the maximum cheating probability
max{P∗A, P∗B} ≥ 1/
√
D.
1The protocols considered in this paper have a much different form than these protocols.
2
1.1 Simple classical protocols
We first show that simple classical protocols exist with decent security.
Protocol 1 (Classical protocol).
• Bob chooses a subset S ⊆ [D] with |S| = m, uniformly at random, and sends S to Alice. If |S| 6= m,
Alice aborts.
• Alice selects d ∈ S uniformly at random and tells Bob her selection. If d 6∈ S, Bob aborts.
• Both parties output d.
We see that this is a valid die-rolling protocol as each party outputs the same value d ∈ [D] and
each value occurs with equal probability. As for the cheating probabilities, it is straightforward to
see that
P∗A =
m
D
and P∗B =
1
m
.
Besides being extremely simple, this protocol has the following interesting properties:
• The product P∗A,dP∗B,d = 1/D, for any d ∈ [D], saturates Kitaev’s lower bound for every
d ∈ [D].
• For D square and m =
√
D, we have P∗A = P
∗
B = 1/
√
D, yielding an optimal protocol!
• If D is not square, the protocol is not fair, meaning that P∗A 6= P∗B.
Note that to minimize max{P∗A, P∗B}, it does not make sense to choose large m (greater than
⌈√D⌉) or small m (less than ⌊√D⌋). We can see that for D = 3, D = 7, or D = 8, for example, that
choosing the ceiling is better while for D = 5 or D = 10 choosing the floor is better. Thus, we keep
both the cases and summarize the overall security of the above protocol in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For D ≥ 2, there exists a classical die-rolling protocol satisfying
1√
D
≤ max{P∗A, P∗B} = min
{
⌈√D⌉
D
,
1
⌊√D⌋
}
(1)
which is optimal when D is square.
Note that the special case of D = 2 has either Alice or Bob able to cheat perfectly, which
is the case for all classical coin-flipping protocols. However, Kitaev’s bound on the product of
cheating probabilities is still (trivially) satisfied. For D = 3, we can choose m = 2 to obtain
max{P∗A, P∗B} = 2/3 proving that even classical protocols can have nontrivial security, which is
vastly different than the D = 2 case. The values from (1) for D ∈ {2, . . . , 10} are later presented in
Table 1.
Remark 1. The protocol above can easily be extended for more parties. For example, if k parties wish to roll
k D-sided dice. If each party rolls one die each, then if k− 1 parties cheat, they cannot force a specific k-dice
outcome with probability greater than 1/D (the probability the honest die landed in their favour). This is
optimal in the k-party Dk-outcome setting. (See the work of Aharon and Silman [AS10] for further details
about this setting and its security definitions.)
We are not aware of other lower bounds for classical die-rolling protocols apart from those
implied by Kitaev’s bounds above. We see that sometimes classical protocols can be optimal, for
example when D is square. We now consider how to design (simple) quantum protocols and see
what levels of security they can offer.
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1.2 Quantum protocols based on integer-commitment
Many of the best known explicit protocols for strong coin-flipping are based on bit-commitment
[Amb01, SR01, KN04, NST16]. Optimal protocols are known for bit-commitment as well [CK11],
but are again based on weak coin-flipping and are thus very complicated.
In this paper, we generalize the simple, explicit protocols based on bit-commitment such that
Alice commits to an integer instead of a bit. More precisely, a quantum protocol based on integer-
commitment has the following form.
Protocol 2 (Quantum protocol). A quantum die-rolling protocol based on integer-commitment, denoted
here as DRIC, is defined as follows:
• Alice chooses a random a ∈ [D] and creates the state |ψa〉 ∈ A ⊗ B and sends the subsystem B to
Bob.
• Bob sends a uniformly random b ∈ [D] to Alice.
• Alice reveals a to Bob and sends him the subsystem A.
• Bob checks if A⊗B is in state |ψa〉 using the measurement {Πa := |ψa〉 〈ψa| , Πabort := I −Πa}.
Bob accepts/rejects a based on his measurement outcome.
• If Bob does not abort, Alice and Bob output d := a+ b mod D+ 1 ∈ [D].
The special case of D = 2 yields the structure of the simple, explicit coin-flipping protocols
mentioned above. Indeed, these protocols are very easy to describe, one needs only the knowledge
of the D states |ψa〉 and, implicitly, the systems they act on, A and B.
We start by formulating the cheating probabilities of a DRIC-protocol using semidefinite pro-
gramming. Once we have established the semidefinite programming cheating strategy formula-
tions, we are able to analyze the security of DRIC-protocols. Furthermore, we are able to analyze
modifications to such protocols and the corresponding changes in security.
In this paper, we present a DRIC-protocol with near-optimal security. We develop this protocol
in several steps described below.
The first step is to start with a protocol with decent security. To do this, we show how to create
a DRIC-protocol with the same cheating probabilities as Protocol 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a DRIC-protocol with the same cheating probabilities as in Protocol 1.
The second step is to give a process where anyDRIC-protocol can be made more fair, i.e., to try
to equate the maximum cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob. We accomplish this by modifying
the protocol in order to balance Alice and Bob’s cheating probabilities, thereby decreasing the
overall maximum cheating probability.
Proposition 2. If there exists a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β, then there
exists a DRIC-protocol with maximum cheating probability
max{P∗A, P∗B} ≤
Dmax{β, α} −min{β, α}
D|β− α|+ D− 1 ≤ max{β, α}.
Moreover, the last inequality is strict when α 6= β yielding a strictly better protocol.
By combining the above two propositions, we are able to obtain the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. For any D ≥ 2, there exists a (quantum) DRIC-protocol satisfying
1√
D
≤ max{P∗A, P∗B} ≤ min
{
D+ ⌊√D⌋
D(⌊√D⌋+ 1) ,
1+ ⌈√D⌉
D+ ⌈√D⌉
}
which is strictly better than Protocol 1 when D is not square.
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Since min
{
D+ ⌊√D⌋
D(⌊√D⌋+ 1) ,
1+ ⌈√D⌉
D+ ⌈√D⌉
}
≈ 1√
D
for large D, this bound is very close to opti-
mal. To compare numbers, we list the values for D ∈ {2, . . . , 10}, below.
Table 1: Values of our bounds (as truncated percentages) for various protocols and values of D.
We see that the quantum protocol performs very well, even for D as small as 3.
D 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Explicit Protocol in [AS10] 75% 66% 62% 60% 58% 57% 56% 55% 55%
Our Classical Protocol 100% 66% 50% 50% 50% 42% 37% 33% 33%
Our Quantum Protocol 75% 60% 50% 46% 44% 40% 36% 33% 32%
Kitaev’s lower bound 70% 57% 50% 44% 40% 37% 35% 33% 31%
Related literature. Quantum protocols for a closely related cryptographic task known as string-
commitment have been considered [Ken03, Tsu05, Tsu06, BCH+08, Jai08]. Technically, this is the
case of integer-commitment when D = 2n (if the string has n bits). It is worth noting that the
quantum protocols considered in this paper are quite similar, but the security definitions are very
different. Roughly speaking, they are concerned with quantum protocols where Alice is able to
“cheat” on a bits and Bob is able to “learn” b bits of information about the n bit string. Multiple
protocols and security trade-offs are given in the above references.
The use of semidefinite programming has been very valuable in the study of quantum crypto-
graphic protocols, see for example [Kit02, Moc05, Moc07, CKS13, NST15, NST16]. Roughly speak-
ing, if one is able to formulate cheating probabilities as semidefinite programs, then the problem of
analyzing cryptographic security can be translated into a concrete mathematical problem. More-
over, one then has the entire theory of semidefinite programming at their disposal. This is the
approach taken in this work, to shine new light on a cryptographic task using the lens of semidef-
inite programming.
1.3 Kitaev’s lower bound and the quantum state discrimination problem
The security analysis of DRIC-protocols has many similarities to the quantum state discrimination
problem. Suppose you are given a quantum state ρ ∈ {ρ1, . . . , ρn} with respective probabilities
p1, . . . , pn. The quantum state discrimination problem is to determine which state you have been
given (by means of measuring it) with the maximum probability of being correct. We only briefly
discuss this problem in this work; the interested reader is referred to the survey [Spe14] and the
references therein.
We give a very short proof of Kitaev’s lower bound for the special case of DRIC-protocols.
Afterwards, we show that it can be generalized to show the following bound for the quantum
state discrimination problem.
Proposition 3. If given a state from the set {ρ1, . . . , ρn}, with respective probabilities {p1, . . . , pn}, then
there exists a POVM to learn which state was given with success probability at least λmin
((
∑
n
i=1W
−1
i
)−1)
for any positive definite Hermitian {W1, . . . ,Wn} satisfying 〈Wi, ρi〉 ≤ 1, for all i ∈ [n]. Here, λmin de-
notes the smallest eigenvalue of a Hermitian matrix.
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Note that the above proposition is indeed independent of the pi’s and could thus probably be
strengthened. However, we use cryptographic reasoning to argue that this bound can be tight.
Paper organization. In Section 2 we develop the semidefinite programming cheating strategy
formulations for Alice and Bob. In Section 3 we exhibit a DRIC-protocol then use the semidefi-
nite programming formulations to prove Proposition 1, that the protocol has the same cheating
probabilities as Protocol 1. Section 4 shows how to balance the probabilities in a DRIC-protocol
by showing how to reduce Bob’s cheating, then how to reduce Alice’s. Combining these yields a
proof of Proposition 2. Lastly, in Section 5, we give a short proof of Kitaev’s lower boundwhen ap-
plied to DRIC-protocols then generalize it to the quantum state discrimination problem to prove
Proposition 3.
2 Semidefinite programming cheating strategy formulations
In this section, we use the theory of semidefinite programming to formulate Alice and Bob’s max-
imum cheating probabilities for a DRIC-protocol. The formulations in this section are a general-
ization of those for bit-commitment, see [NST16] and the references therein for details about this
special case.
2.1 Semidefinite programming
Semidefinite programming is the theory of optimizing a linear function over a positive semidefi-
nite matrix variable subject to finitely many affine constraints. A semidefinite program (SDP) can
be written in the following form without loss of generality:
p∗ := sup{〈C,X〉 : A(X) = B, X  0} (2)
where A is a linear transformation, C and B are Hermitian, and X  Y means that X − Y is
(Hermitian) positive semidefinite.
Associated with every SDP is a dual SDP:
d∗ := inf{〈B,Y〉 : A∗(Y) = C+ S, S  0, Y is Hermitian} (3)
where A∗ is the adjoint of A.
We refer to the optimization problem (2) as the primal or primal SDP and to the optimization
problem (3) as the dual or dual SDP. We say that the primal is feasible if there exists an X satisfying
the (primal) constraints
A(X) = B and X  0
and we say the dual is feasible if there exists (Y, S) satisfying the (dual) constraints
A∗(Y) = C+ S, S  0, and Y is Hermitian.
If further we have X positive definite, then the primal is said to be strictly feasible. If further we
have S positive definite, then the dual is said to be strictly feasible.
Semidefinite programming has a rich and powerful duality theory. In particular, we use the
following:
Weak duality: If the primal and dual are both feasible, then p∗ ≤ d∗.
Strong duality: If the primal and dual are both strictly feasible, then p∗ = d∗ and both attain an
optimal solution.
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For more information about semidefinite programming and its duality theory, the reader is re-
ferred to [BV04].
2.2 Cheating strategy formulations
To study a fixed DRIC-protocol, it is convenient to define the following reduced states
ρa := TrA(|ψa〉 〈ψa|)
for all a ∈ [D]. We show that they appear in both the case of cheating Alice and cheating Bob.
Cheating Bob. To see how Bob can cheat, notice that he only has one message he sends to Alice.
Thus, he must send b ∈ [D] to force the outcome he wishes. For example, if he wishes to force the
outcome d, he would send b such that d = a+ b mod D+ 1. Therefore, he must extract the value
of a from B to accomplish this. Suppose he measures B with the measurement
{M1, . . . ,MD}
where the outcome of the measurement corresponds to Bob’s guess for a. If Alice chose a ∈ [D],
he succeeds in cheating if his guess is correct, which happens with probability
〈Ma, ρa〉.
Since the choice of Alice’s integer a is uniformly random, we can calculate Bob’s optimal cheating
probability as
P∗B = max
{
1
D ∑
a∈[D]
〈Ma, ρa〉 : ∑
a∈[D]
Ma = IB, Ma  0, ∀a ∈ [D]
}
(4)
noting that the variables being optimized over correspond to a POVM measurement. Note that
the maximum is attained since the set of feasible (M1, . . . ,MD) forms a compact set.
Now that Bob’s optimal cheating probability is stated in terms of an SDP, we can examine its
dual as shown in the lemma below.
Lemma 2. For any DRIC-protocol, we have
P∗B = min
{
Tr(X) : X  1
D
ρa, ∀a ∈ [D]
}
. (5)
Proof. One can check using the definitions (2) and (3) that the optimization problem (5) is the dual
of (4). Defining Ma =
1
D IB, for all a ∈ [D], yields a strictly feasible solution for the primal. Also,
X = IB is a strictly feasible solution for the dual. Thus, by strong duality, both the primal and dual
attain an optimal solution and their optimal values are the same.
We refer to the optimization problem (4) as Bob’s primal SDP and to the optimization prob-
lem (5) as Bob’s dual SDP. The utility of having dual SDP formulations is that any feasible solution
yields an upper bound on the maximum cheating probability. Proving upper bounds on cheating
probabilities would otherwise be a very hard task.
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Cheating Alice. If Alice wishes to force Bob to accept outcome d ∈ [D], she must convince him
that the state in A ⊗ B is indeed |ψa〉 where a is such that d = a + b mod D + 1. Note that this
choice of a is determined after learning b from Bob, which occurs with uniform probability.
To quantify the extent to which Alice can cheat, we examine the states Bob has during the pro-
tocol. We know that Bob measures and accepts a with the measurement operator Πa := |ψa〉 〈ψa|.
Let (a,A) be Alice’s last message. Then Bob’s state at the end of the protocol is given by a density
operator σa acting on A⊗ B which is accepted with probability 〈σa, |ψa〉 〈ψa|〉. Note that Alice’s
first message B is in state σ := TrA(σa) which is independent of a (since Alice’s first message
does not depend on a when she cheats). Thus, the states under Bob’s control are subject to the
constraints
TrA(σa) = σ, ∀a ∈ [D], Tr(σ) = 1, σ, σ1 . . . , σD  0. (6)
(Note that Tr(σa) = 1, for all a ∈ [D], is implied by the constraints above, and is thus omitted.)
On the other hand, if Alice maintains a purification of the states above, then using Uhlmann’s
Theorem [Uhl76] she can prepare any set of states satisfying conditions (6).
Thus, we have
P∗A = max
{
1
D ∑
a∈[D]
〈σa, |ψa〉 〈ψa|〉 : TrA(σa) = σ, ∀a ∈ [D], Tr(σ) = 1, σ, σ1 . . . , σD  0
}
. (7)
Again, since the set of feasible (σ, σ1, . . . , σD) is compact, the above SDP attains an optimal solu-
tion.
Similar to the case of cheating Bob, we can view the dual of Alice’s cheating SDP above as
shown in the lemma below.
Lemma 3. For any DRIC-protocol, we have
P∗A = min
{
s : sIB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za, IA ⊗ Za  1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa| , ∀a ∈ [D], Za is Hermitian
}
. (8)
Proof. It can be checked that (8) is in fact the dual of (7). By defining σ and each σ1, . . . , σD to be
completely mixed states, we have that the primal is strictly feasible. By defining s = D + 1 and
each Z1, . . . ,ZD to be equal to IB, we have that the dual is strictly feasible as well. The result now
holds by applying strong duality.
We refer to the optimization problem (7) asAlice’s primal SDP and the optimization problem (8)
as Alice’s dual SDP.
Note that every solution feasible in Alice’s dual SDP has Za being positive semidefinite, for all
a ∈ [D]. We can further assume that each Za is positive definite if we sacrifice the attainment of
an optimal solution. This is because we can take an optimal solution (s,Z1, . . . ,ZD) and consider
(s+ εD,Z1 + εIB, . . . ,ZD + εIB)which is also feasible for any ε > 0, and s+ εD approaches s = P∗A
as ε decreases to 0.
Next, we use an analysis similar to one found in [Moc05] and [Wat09] to simplify the constraint
IA ⊗ Za  |ψa〉 〈ψa| when Za is positive definite. Since X → ZXZ−1 is an automorphism of the set
of positive semidefinite matrices for any fixed positive definite Z, we have
IA ⊗ Za  1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa| ⇐⇒ IA⊗B  (IA ⊗ Z−1/2a )
(
1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa|
)
(IA ⊗ Z−1/2a ). (9)
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Note that since the quantity on the right is positive semidefinite with rank at most 1, its largest
eigenvalue is equal to its trace which is equal to
1
D
〈IA ⊗ Z−1a , |ψa〉 〈ψa|〉 =
1
D
〈Z−1a , TrA(|ψa〉 〈ψa|)〉 =
1
D
〈Z−1a , ρa〉.
Thus, we can rewrite (9) as
IA ⊗ Za  1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa| ⇐⇒ 1
D
〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D.
Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For any DRIC-protocol, we have
P∗A = inf
{
s : sIB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za, 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, ∀a ∈ [D], Za is positive definite, ∀a ∈ [D]
}
. (10)
We also refer to the optimization problem (10) as Alice’s dual SDP and we distinguish them by
equation number.
3 Finding a decent DRIC-protocol
In this section, we exhibit a DRIC-protocol which has the same cheating probabilities as Protocol 1:
P∗B =
1
m
and P∗A =
m
D
.
To do this, define Tm to be the subsets of [D] of cardinality m and note that |Tm| =
(
D
m
)
. Consider
the following states
|ψa〉 := 1√(
D− 1
m− 1
) ∑
S∈Tm : a∈S
|S〉 |S〉 ∈ A⊗B,
for a ∈ [D], whereA = B = C|Tm|. Notice that
ρa := TrA (|ψa〉 〈ψa|) = 1(D− 1
m− 1
) ∑
S∈Tm : a∈S
|S〉 〈S| .
We now use the cheating SDPs developed in the previous section to analyze the cheating prob-
abilities of this protocol.
Cheating Bob. To prove that Bob can cheat with probability at least 1/m, suppose he measures
his message from Alice in the computational basis. He then obtains a random subset S ∈ Tm such
that a ∈ S. He then guesses which integer is a and responds with the appropriate choice for b to
get his desired outcome. He succeeds if and only if his guess for a (from the m choices in S) is
correct. This strategy succeeds with probability 1/m. Thus, P∗B ≥ 1/m.
To prove Bob cannot cheat with probability greater than 1/m, notice that X =
1
D
(
D − 1
m− 1
) IB
satisfies
X  1
D
ρa, ∀a ∈ [D],
and thus is feasible in Bob’s dual (5). Therefore, P∗B ≤ Tr(X) = 1/m, as desired.
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Cheating Alice. Alice can cheat by creating the maximally entangled state
|Tm〉 := 1√|Tm| ∑S∈Tm |S〉 |S〉 ∈ A⊗ B
and sending B to Bob. After learning b, she sends a such that a + b mod D + 1 is her desired
outcome. She also sendsA to Bob (without altering it in any way). Thus, her cheating probability
is precisely the probability of her passing Bob’s cheat detection which is
〈Πa, |Tm〉 〈Tm|〉 = 〈|ψa〉 〈ψa| , |Tm〉 〈Tm|〉 = |〈Tm|ψa〉|2 = m
D
.
Therefore, this cheating strategy succeeds with probability m/D, proving P∗A ≥ m/D.
To prove this strategy is optimal, we use Alice’s dual (10). Define
Za :=
1
D ∑
S∈Tm : a∈S
|S〉 〈S|+ ε ∑
S∈Tm : a 6∈S
|S〉 〈S|
where ε is a small positive constant. Za is invertible and we can write
Z−1a := D ∑
S∈Tm : a∈S
|S〉 〈S|+ 1
ε ∑
S∈Tm : a 6∈S
|S〉 〈S| .
We see that each Za satisfies 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 = D, for all a ∈ [D]. Also,
Za  1
D ∑
S∈Tm : a∈S
|S〉 〈S|+ εIB
thus
∑
a∈[D]
Za  1
D ∑
a∈[D]
∑
S∈Tm : a∈S
|S〉 〈S|+ ε D IB =
(m
D
+ εD
)
IB.
Thus, s =
m
D
+ εD satisfies
s IB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za
proving P∗A ≤ s =
m
D
+ εD, for all ε > 0. Therefore, P∗A = m/D, as desired.
4 Balancing Alice and Bob’s cheating probabilities
This section is comprised of two parts. We first focus on reducing Bob’s cheating probabilities,
then Alice’s.
4.1 Building new protocols that reduce Bob’s cheating
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 5. If there exists a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β, then there
exists another DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α
′ and P∗B = β
′ where
β′ ≤ (1− t)β + t
D
and α′ ≤ (1− t)α + t.
for any t ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. To prove this lemma, fix a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β
defined by the states |ψa〉 ∈ A ⊗ B, for a ∈ [D]. Extend each of the Hilbert spaces A and B by
another basis vector |⊥〉 and denote these Hilbert spaces by A′ and B′, respectively. In short,
A′ := A⊕ span{|⊥〉} and B′ := B ⊕ span{|⊥〉}. Note that
〈⊥,⊥|ψa〉 = 0, for all a ∈ [D].
We now analyze the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob in the new DRIC-protocol defined
by the states
|ψ′a〉 :=
√
1− t |ψa〉+
√
t |⊥,⊥〉 ∈ A′ ⊗ B′, for all a ∈ [D]
as a function of t ∈ (0, 1). For this, note that
ρ′a := TrA
(|ψ′a〉 〈ψ′a|) = (1− t) ρa + t |⊥〉 〈⊥| ,
where ρa := TrA (|ψa〉 〈ψa|).
Intuitively, Alice can cheat more if the states |ψa〉 are “close” to each other. On the other hand,
Bob can cheat more if they are “far apart”, at least on the subsystem he receives for the first mes-
sage. What this protocol modification does is make all the states closer together to increase Alice’s
cheating probability but to decrease Bob’s.
Cheating Bob. Let X be an optimal solution to Bob’s dual (5) for the original protocol. So
Tr(X) = β and X  1D ρa, for all a ∈ [D].
To upper bound Bob’s cheating probability in the new protocol, we show that
X′ := (1− t)X + t
D
|⊥〉 〈⊥|
is feasible for Bob’s dual for the new protocol. We have
X′ = (1− t)X + t
D
|⊥〉 〈⊥|  1− t
D
ρa +
t
D
|⊥〉 〈⊥| = 1
D
ρ′a,
for all a ∈ [D]. Thus X′ is feasible proving that P∗B ≤ Tr(X′) = (1− t)β+ t/D for the new protocol.
Cheating Alice. We now repeat the same process for Alice. Let (s,Z1, . . . ,ZD) be a feasible so-
lution for Alice’s dual (10) for the original protocol. That is, sIB  ∑a∈[D] Za and each positive
definite Za satisfies 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, for each a ∈ [D]. Define
Z′a := δ Za + ε |⊥〉 〈⊥| ,
for a ∈ [D], for some choice of positive constants δ and ε to be specified later. Notice that
(Z′a)
−1 =
1
δ
Z−1a +
1
ε
|⊥〉 〈⊥| .
To show the analogous constraints are satisfiedwith Z′a, recall that 〈|⊥〉 〈⊥| , ρa〉 = 0 for all a ∈ [D].
Using this, we have
〈(Z′a)−1, ρ′a〉 =
1
δ
〈Z−1a , ρ′a〉+
1
ε
〈|⊥〉 〈⊥| , ρ′a〉 ≤
D(1− t)
δ
+
t
ε
.
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By choosing δ and ε appropriately, we can make the quantity on the right equal to D. To finish the
proof of feasibility, note that
∑
a∈[D]
Z′a = δ ∑
a∈[D]
Za + εD |⊥〉 〈⊥|  δs IB + εD |⊥〉 〈⊥|  s′ IB′
where s′ := max{δs, εD}. By choosing
ε =
s(1− t) + t
D
> 0 and δ = (1− t) + t
s
> 0
we get 〈(Z′a)−1, ρ′a〉 ≤ D and s′ = s(1− t) + t. Since s can be taken to be arbitrarily close to α, we
have P∗A ≤ (α + ε′)(1− t) + t for all ε′ > 0, finishing the proof.
Note that this lemma is useful when β > α. In this case, one can choose
t =
β− α
(1− 1/D) + (β− α) ∈ (0, 1)
to equate the upper bounds. If α > β, then no choice of t ∈ (0, 1) will make the two upper bounds
in Lemma 5 equal. We summarize in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If there exists a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β,with β > α,
then there exists another DRIC-protocol with maximum cheating probability
max{P∗A, P∗B} ≤
Dβ− α
Dβ− Dα + D− 1 < β.
4.2 Building new protocols that reduce Alice’s cheating
In this subsection, we show how to reduce Alice’s cheating probabilities in a DRIC-protocol.
Lemma 6. If there exists a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β, then there
exists another DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α
′ and P∗B = β
′ where
β′ ≤ (1− t)β + t and α′ ≤ (1− t)α + t
D
,
for t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. To prove this lemma, fix a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β
defined by the states |ψa〉 ∈ A⊗B, for a ∈ [D]. Extend each of the Hilbert spaces A and B by the
set of orthogonal basis vectors {|⊥a〉 : a ∈ [D]}, and denote these new Hilbert spaces by A′ and
B′, respectively. In other words,
A′ := A⊕ span{|⊥1〉 , . . . , |⊥D〉} and B′ := B ⊕ span{|⊥1〉 , . . . , |⊥D〉}.
Note that
〈⊥a′′ ,⊥a′ |ψa〉 = 0, for all a, a′ , a′′ ∈ [D].
Again, we analyze the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob in the new DRIC-protocol defined
by the states
|ψ′a〉 :=
√
1− t |ψa〉+
√
t |⊥a〉 |⊥a〉 ∈ A′ ⊗ B′
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for a ∈ [D]. The reduced states are
ρ′a := (1− t) ρa + t |⊥a〉 〈⊥a|
for a ∈ [D], recalling that ρa := TrA(|ψa〉 〈ψa|). We now analyze the cheating probabilities of this
new protocol as a function of t ∈ (0, 1).
Intuitively, this protocol modification works in the opposite manner of the last. Here, we are
making the states farther apart as to decrease Alice’s cheating at the expense of increasing Bob’s.
Cheating Bob. Let X be an optimal solution for Bob’s dual (5) for the original protocol. Define
X′ := (1− t)X + t
D ∑
a∈[D]
|⊥a〉 〈⊥a|
which can easily be seen to be feasible in the dual SDP for the new protocol. Thus, we have
P∗B ≤ Tr(X′) = (1− t)β + t.
Cheating Alice. Let (s,Z1, . . . ,ZD) be a feasible solution for Alice’s dual (10) for the original
protocol. That is, sIB  ∑a∈[D] Za and each positive definite Za satisfies 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, for each
a ∈ [D].
Define
Z′a := δ Za + ε |⊥a〉 〈⊥a|+ ζ ∑
c∈[D],c 6=a
|⊥c〉 〈⊥c|
for positive constants δ, ε, ζ to be specified later. Note that 〈∑c∈[D],c 6=a |⊥c〉 〈⊥c| , ρ′a〉 = 0, for all
a ∈ [D]. We have Z′a is invertible and we can write its inverse as
(Z′a)
−1 =
1
δ
Z−1a +
1
ε
|⊥a〉 〈⊥a|+ 1
ζ ∑
c∈[D],c 6=a
|⊥c〉 〈⊥c|
which satisfies
〈(Z′a)−1, ρ′a〉 =
1
δ
〈Z−1a , ρ′a〉+
1
ε
〈|⊥a〉 〈⊥a| , ρ′a〉 ≤
D(1− t)
δ
+
t
ε
.
Also note that
∑
a∈[D]
Z′a = δ ∑
a∈[D]
Za + ε ∑
a∈[D]
|⊥a〉 〈⊥a|+ ζ ∑
a∈[D]
∑
c∈[D],c 6=a
|⊥c〉 〈⊥c|
 δs IB + (ε + ζ(D− 1)) ∑
a∈[D]
|⊥a〉 〈⊥a|
 s′ IB′
where s′ := max{δs, ε + ζ(D − 1)}. Setting
ε = (1− t)s+ t
D
> 0 and δ = (1− t) + t
Ds
> 0
we get 〈(Z′a)−1, ρ′a〉 ≤ D and s′ = (1− t)s+ t/D+ ζ(D− 1). Since s can be taken to be arbitrarily
close to α, and ζ arbitrarily close to 0, we have P∗A ≤ (α+ ε′)(1− t) + t/D+ ε′(D− 1) for all ε′ > 0,
finishing the proof.
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As opposed to Lemma 5, the above lemma is useful when α > β. Similarly, if β > α, then no
choice of t ∈ (0, 1) will make the two upper bounds in Lemma 6 equal.
By symmetry, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If there exists a DRIC-protocol with cheating probabilities P∗A = α and P
∗
B = β,with α > β,
then there exists another DRIC-protocol with maximum cheating probability
max{P∗A, P∗B} ≤
Dα− β
Dα− Dβ + D− 1 < α.
Note that if α = β, the quantity Dα−βDα−Dβ+D−1 is equal to α(= β). Thus, we still have
max{P∗A, P∗B} ≤
Dα− β
Dα− Dβ + D− 1
holding, although no protocol modification is necessary. Therefore, Proposition 2 now follows
from combining Corollaries 1 and 2 and the comment above.
5 Kitaev’s lower bound and quantum state discrimination
We start this section with a short proof of Kitaev’s lower bound for DRIC-protocols.
5.1 Kitaev’s lower bound
Let (s,Z1, . . . ,ZD) be an optimal solution for Alice’s dual SDP (8), i.e.,
P∗A = s, sIB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za, and IA ⊗ Za  1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa| , for all a ∈ [D].
Note that from the last constraint in the SDP, we require that Za is positive semidefinite for all a ∈
[D]. We may assume that sIB = ∑Da=1 Za, without loss of generality, since we can always increase
Z1 to make this the case. I.e., we can redefine Z1 → Z1 +
(
sIB −∑a∈[D] Za
)
which maintains the
same value for s and still satisfies all the constraints. Define the matrices Ma :=
1
sZa for all a ∈ [D].
We see this is feasible for Bob’s cheating SDP (4). We thus have that
P∗B ≥
1
D
D
∑
a=1
〈ρa,Ma〉 = 1
sD
D
∑
a=1
〈ρa,Za〉 = 1
sD
D
∑
a=1
〈|ψa〉 〈ψa| , IA ⊗ Za〉 ≥ 1
sD2
D
∑
a=1
〈|ψa〉 〈ψa| , |ψa〉 〈ψa|〉
implying that P∗AP
∗
B ≥ 1/D, which is precisely Kitaev’s lower bound for die-rolling.
Remark 2. This proof is slightly different than Kitaev’s original proof which involves combining Bob’s and
Alice’s optimal dual solutions. The above proof takes an optimal dual solution for Alice, then creates a valid
cheating strategy for Bob. This new perspective could shed light on the nature of dual solutions and their
role in creating point games (which are still regarded as being quite mysterious). Point games are beyond
the scope of this work; the interested reader is referred to [Moc07, ACG+15, NST15] for further details.
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5.2 Quantum state discrimination
Consider now a DRIC-protocol but Alice now chooses a ∈ [D] with probably pa (instead of uni-
formly at random). Then the amount Bob can cheat in this modified protocol exactly corresponds
to the success probability of a quantum state discrimination (QSD) problem.
We can easily modify the optimization problem (4) to see that the optimal success probability
in the QSD problem is given by
β := max
{
∑
a∈[D]
pa〈Ma, ρa〉 : ∑
a∈[D]
Ma = IB , Ma  0, ∀a ∈ [D]
}
,
where we denote the optimal value as β (to distinguish its context from cryptographic security for
the moment).
Consider again Alice’s dual SDP (8)
α := min
{
s : sIB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za, IA ⊗ Za  1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa| , ∀a ∈ [D], Za is Hermitian
}
.
Then repeating the proof of Kitaev’s lower bound above, we get that β α ≥ 1/D. We now bound
β by bounding α:
α = min
{
s : sIB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za, IA ⊗ Za  1
D
|ψa〉 〈ψa| , ∀a ∈ [D], Za is Hermitian
}
= inf
{
s : sIB  ∑
a∈[D]
Za, 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, ∀a ∈ [D], Za is positive definite, ∀a ∈ [D]
}
= inf
{
λmax
(
∑
a∈[D]
Za
)
: 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, ∀a ∈ [D], Za is positive definite, ∀a ∈ [D]
}
where λmax denotes the largest eigenvalue of a Hermitian matrix. Since λmax(A) = (λmin(A−1))−1
for A positive definite, we have
α =

sup

λmin

( ∑
a∈[D]
Za
)−1 : 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, ∀a ∈ [D], Za is positive definite, ∀a ∈ [D]




−1
.
It now follows easily that
1
αD
= sup

λmin


(
∑
a∈[D]
(DZa)
)−1 : 〈Z−1a , ρa〉 ≤ D, ∀a ∈ [D], Za is positive definite, ∀a ∈ [D]

 .
Now Proposition 3 follows by definingWa := (DZa)−1 for all a ∈ [D].
We nowmention how Proposition 3 can be tight. We see that if we view the QSD problem from
the perspective of a cheating Bob in a DRIC-protocol, then the (non)tightness of Proposition 3 is
exactly characterized by the (non)tightness of Kitaev’s lower bound above. Thus, the examples
of DRIC-protocols saturating Kitaev’s lower bound, i.e., P∗BP
∗
A = 1/D, yield instances of the QSD
problem where Proposition 3 is tight.
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